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Hell-Bent on Awarding Recovery to
Terrorism Victims: The Evolution and
Application of the Antiterrorism
Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act
I. Introduction
In direct response to the Lebanon hostage crisis and to attacks
that claimed the lives of an American college student studying in
Israel, three American civilian pilots on a humanitarian mission
over the Florida Straits, and 189 American passengers on a
commercial jet bound from London to New York, Congress
strengthened the U.S. antiterrorism regime with sweeping new
legislation. The most radical of several initiatives taken by
Congress was the amendment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA)1 in 1996 and 1998. The amendments allowed the
federal courts of the United States unilaterally to exercise
jurisdiction in civil suits over foreign sovereigns responsible for
committing or supporting acts of international terrorism against
Americans The amendments also gave the courts great power to
abridge foreign sovereign immunity by authorizing the attachment
and execution of property of the foreign state located in the United
States to satisfy judgments obtained by terrorism victims.'
The passage of the legislation, although designed to
compensate victims and their families, opened a Pandora's box and
divided the branches of federal government when plaintiffs sought
relief under its provisions. Although at the signing ceremony for
the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA)4, President Clinton publicly pledged his support for the
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1611 (1994
& Supp. 1998).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. 1998).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) (Supp. 1998).
4. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
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families of the victims of terrorism,5 his Administration subse-
quently worked to undermine the effectiveness of the new
amendments. In two very prominent cases, Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran6 and Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba7, the
Administration actively intervened and opposed enforcement of
judgments obtained against foreign state sponsors of terrorism. As
a result, many observers, including the plaintiffs in those cases,
characterized the government's actions as one hand taking away
what another hand gave.8
This comment examines the controversy surrounding
enforcement of judgments under the antiterrorism amendments to
the FSIA. Section two reviews the structure and development of
the 1996 and 1998 amendments, as well as the political climate that
facilitated the passage of the legislation. Section three briefly
highlights the legal obstacles to recovery encountered by the
plaintiffs in Flatow and Alejandre after money damages were
awarded under the amendments. Section four draws examines the
position of the Executive branch with respect to enforcement of
judgments against terrorist states and considers the effect of the
government's intervention in litigation filed under the antiterrorism
amendments. Section five discusses the October 2000 amendments
to Congress' antiterrorism regime and questions whether the new
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
5. See Remarks on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, PUB. PAPERS, Administration of William J. Clinton, 1996, Book 1
(Apr. 24, 1996):
[L]et us honor those who lost their lives by resolving to hold fast against
the forces of violence and division, by never allowing them to shake our
resolve or break our spirit, to frighten us into sacrificing our sacred
freedoms or surrendering a drop of precious American liberty. Rather
we must guard against them, speak against them, and fight against them.
I'd like to close with a word to all of the family members of Americans
slain by terrorists and to the survivors of terrorism .... Your vigilance
has sharpened our vigilance. And so I sign my name to this bill, in your
names. We renew our fight against those who seek to terrorize us, in
your names. We send a loud, clear message today all over the world, in
your names: America will never surrender to terror. America will never
tolerate terrorism. America will never abide terrorists. Wherever they
come from, wherever they go, we will go after them. We will not rest
until we have brought them all to justice and secured a future for our
people, safe from the harm they would do - in your names.
6. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
7. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
8. See Stephen M. Flatow, In This Case, I Can't Be Diplomatic; I Lost a Child
to Terrorism; Now I'm Losing U.S. Support, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1999, at B02.
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law, notwithstanding its provision of compensation, resolves the
problems Congress sought to remedy.
II. Development of the 1996 and 1998 Antiterrorism
Amendments to the FSIA
A. Jurisdiction over Foreign State Sponsors of Terrorism
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA)9 became law on April 24, 1996. Section 221 of that act
amended two sections of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA) ° to create a private civil cause of action by U.S.
nationals" or their survivors against foreign state sponsors of
terrorism for injuries or death inflicted outside the United States.
First, AEDPA added section 1605(a)(7) to the FSIA, which states
that the district courts of the United States may exercise jurisdiction
over all claims
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the
provision of material support or resources.., for such act if
such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an
official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting
within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency
12
In order to trigger the exception to foreign sovereign immunity, the
claimant proceeding under section 1605(a)(7) must establish that
the defendant foreign state was or is designated as a state sponsor
of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
19793 or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 196114.15
The claimant must also establish that he or the victim was a
national of the United States when the act of terrorism occurred
9. 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
10. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1611 (1994
& Supp. 1998).
11. "National" is defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1994), as a citizen or permanent resident
alien.
12. § 221, 110 Stat. at 1241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. 1998)).
13. Export Administration Act of 1979 § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050) (1979).
14. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620A, 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1961).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A).
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and that the claimant offered the foreign state a reasonable
opportunity to arbitrate the claim. 6
Congress expanded the exceptions to the jurisdictional
immunity of foreign states in legislation made part of the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997.7 The relevant portion of
that Act provides a cause of action by a terrorism victim or his legal
representative against agents of a foreign state for compensatory
and punitive damages when the United States otherwise has
jurisdiction over the foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)."8
B. Enforcement of Judgments
AEDPA specifically included an enforcement mechanism to
ensure that judgments obtained against foreign states would be
satisfied. Section 221 of AEDPA added section 1610(a)(7) to the
FSIA to allow attachment and execution of property of a foreign
state used for commercial purposes in the United States to satisfy
judgments relating to claims brought under section 1605(a)(7). 9
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B).
17. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-172 (1996) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (Supp. 1998)).
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (Supp. 1998), note: Liability of Agents of State
Sponsors of Terrorism to U.S. Nationals, which provides:
(a) An official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism designated under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 [50 U.S.C. App. § 24050)] while acting within
the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a
United States national or the national's legal representative for personal
injury or death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for
which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under
section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, for money damages
which may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, and
punitive damages if the acts were among those described in section
1605(a)(7).
(b) Provisions related to statute of limitations and limitations on
discovery that would apply to an action brought under 28 U.S.C. 1605(f)
and (g) shall also apply to actions brought under this section. No action
shall be maintained under this action if an official, employee, or agent of
the United States, while acting within the scope of his or her office,
employment, or agency would not be liable for such acts if carried out
within the United States.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) now provides that the
property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section
1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United
States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from
execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of
a State after the effective date of this Act, if ... (7) the judgment relates
to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section
1605(a)(7), regardless of whether the property is or was involved with the
[Vol. 19:1
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In 1998, Congress expanded the exceptions to immunity from
attachment or execution by adding subsection (f) to section 1610 of
the FSIA to expose to execution specific property of foreign states,
including blocked assets and property used for diplomatic
purposes.2' The same legislation, contained in the Omnibus
act upon which the claim is based.
Note also that section 221 of AEDPA amended the wording of section
1610(b)(2) of the FSIA. Property in the United States of an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United
States is not immune from attachment or execution upon a judgment entered by a
court of the United States if the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency
or instrumentality is not immune by virtue of section 1605(a) (2), (3), (5), or (7) or
1605(b), regardless of whether the property is or was involved in the act upon
which the claim is based. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2).
20. Section 117 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for 1999 ("Appropriations Act"), Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. A,
§ 101(h) [Title I, § 117], 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §8
1610(f)(1)(A), (1)(B), (2)(A), (2)(B) (Supp. 1998)), provides as follows:
(a) EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY FROM ATTACHMENT OR
EXECUTION. Section 1610 of title 28, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(f)(1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including but not
limited to section 208(f) of the Foreign Missions Act (22 U.S.C. 4308(f)),
and except as provided in subparagraph (B), any property with respect to
which financial transactions are prohibited or regulated pursuant to
section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)),
section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)),
sections 202 and 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1702), or any other proclamation, order, regulation,
or license issued pursuant thereto, shall be subject to execution or
attachment in aid of execution of any judgment relating to a claim for
which a foreign state (including any agency or instrumentality of such
state) claiming such property is not immune under section 1605(a)(7).
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply if, at the time the property is
expropriated or seized by the foreign state, the property has been held in
title by a natural person or, if held in trust, has been held for the benefit
of a natural person or persons.
(2)(A) At the request of any party in whose favor a judgment has been
issued with respect to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune
under section 1605(a)(7), the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary
of State shall fully, promptly, and effectively assist any judgment creditor
or any court that has issued any such judgment in identifying, locating,
and executing against the property of that foreign state or any agency or
instrumentality of such state.
(B) In providing such assistance, the Secretaries-
(i) may provide such information to the court under seal; and
(ii) shall provide the information in a manner sufficient to allow the court
to direct the United States Marshall's office to promptly and effectively
execute against that property.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-Section 1606 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by inserting after "punitive damages" the
following: "except any action under section 1605(a)(7) or 1610(f)".
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by subsections (a) and
2000]
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Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for 1999, also expanded the liability of foreign states by allowing
terrorism victims to recover punitive damages.21 Congress made
both of these amendments applicable retroactively to all claims
filed pursuant to section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA.22
C. Congressional Concerns Justifying Amendment of the FSIA
The amendments to the FSIA can best be characterized as a
legislative response to the actual and perceived threat of terrorism
against Americans. In 1988, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland claimed the lives of 270 victims including
189 Americans.23 On February 26, 1993, foreign terrorists bombed
the World Trade Center in New York City, killing seven Americans
and injuring 1,004.24 Between 1980 and 1992, more than 6,500
international terrorist incidents occurred worldwide, killing more
than 5100 people and wounding 12,500.2' Between 1993 and 1996
an additional 1,489 international terrorist attacks occurred,
suggesting an escalation of violence worldwide. 6 A significant
portion of the attacks was directed against American targets.2
7
During the period 1980 to 1996, 635 Americans were killed and
2,206 were wounded. 8
(b) shall apply to any claim for which a foreign state is not immune under
section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, arising before, on, or
after the date of enactment of this Act.
(d) WAIVER.-The President may waive the requirements of this section
in the interest of national security.
21. Id. at § 117(b).
22. Id. at § 117(c).
23. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Admin. Practice of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 825, 103rd Cong. 92
(1994) (letter dated June 16, 1994 from Allan Gerson, Esq., to Sen. Howell Heflin,
Subcommittee Chairman) (hereinafter FSIA Hearing).
24. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1993 at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/arms/PGT-report/1993PGT.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2000); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1998, at App. C,
"Total U.S. Citizen Casualties Caused by International Attacks, 1993-98" at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report (last visited Jan. 5, 2000).
25. FSIA Hearing at 23 (prepared statement and testimony of Sen. Arlen
Specter).
26. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1998, at App. C,
"Total International Terrorist Attacks, 1979-98" at http://www.state.gov/www
/global/terrorism/1998Report (last visited Jan. 5, 2000).
27. FSIA Hearing at 22-23 (prepared statement and testimony of Sen. Arlen
Specter). Between 1980 and 1992, it is estimated that 2500 of the 6500 attacks
were against American targets. Id.
28. FSIA Hearing at 22-23 (prepared statement and testimony of Sen. Arlen
Specter); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1998, at App.
[Vol. 19:1
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Although these numbers might not alone justify sweeping
antiterrorism legislation, Congress was cognizant of the United
States' vulnerability to terrorism and the risk of greater American
casualties. Almost exactly two months after AEDPA became law,
on June 25, 1996, terrorists exploded a large fuel truck outside the
Khubar Towers U.S. military housing facility near Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia, killing nineteen Americans and wounding more than 500.29
Moreover, at the time preceding passage of the amendments, the
media actively portrayed terrorism as one of the greatest post-Cold
War threats facing the United States. Finally, the 1995 bombing of
the Oklahoma City federal building by two Americans served as a
strong reminder to Congress of the United States' vulnerability at
home and abroad.
Not only were the AEDPA amendments to the FSIA a
political response to the prominent bombing attacks, but also they
sought to remedy harms caused to American abductees overseas.
Between 1984 and 1991, twenty American citizens were kidnapped
and held hostage in Lebanon by terrorist groups funded by the
Government of Iran. ° In 1987, Iran reportedly spent in excess of
$64 million in the form of financial support to Hezbollah, the
umbrella organization for many militant Shia Moslem terrorist
groups in Lebanon, including the group that seized Joseph Cicippio,
Alann Steen and Terry Anderson.' Hostage survivors reported in
hearings to Congress that they were "beaten, starved, chained or
bound, exposed to the elements, blindfolded, taunted, subjected to
threatened executions, and denied medical and hygiene facilities.
'3 2
By enacting the antiterrorism amendments, Congress sought to
create an exception to sovereign immunity to afford American
victims of such egregious human rights violations redress in the
American courts.33 Congress also hoped to deter the arbitrary
detention, torture and confinement of U.S. citizens abroad.'4
C, "Total U.S. Citizen Casualties Caused by International Attacks, 1993-98" at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report (last visited Jan. 5, 2000).
29. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PAITERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1996 at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/year.html (last visited Jan.
5, 2000).
30. FSIA Hearing at 23-24 (prepared statement and testimony of Sen. Arlen
Specter); see also FSIA Hearing at 58 (prepared statement of David P. Jacobsen).
31. FSIA Hearing at 23-24 (prepared statement and testimony of Sen. Arlen
Specter).
32. Id. at 23.
33. FSIA Hearing at 23 (prepared statement and testimony of Sen. Arlen
Specter); see also FSIA Hearing at 75 (prepared statement of Joseph Cicippio).
34. Id.
2000]
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The antiterrorism amendments were necessary because the
antiterrorism regime in effect prior to AEDPA was insufficient to
achieve the dual aims of redress and deterrence. For example,
although Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act35 in
1991 with the support of the Clinton Administration, it did not offer
individual plaintiffs any incentive to seek relief under the Act.
First, the TVPA excludes Americans who were abducted abroad
because it allows recovery of money damages only from defendants
who commit torture within the United States. 6 Second, the Act
allows recovery only from individual defendants, who typically do
not own significant personal assets, and therefore cannot provide a
recovery amount suitable to compensate victims for the injuries
suffered. Third, the TVPA does nothing to deter terrorism or to
punish foreign states for providing financial or material support to
terrorists.
Congress was also aware that espousal, by which citizens could
petition the State Department to seek redress on their behalf
through diplomatic channels, offered inadequate relief for human
rights violations.37 Often, the State Department would not take up
individual claims because of diplomatic concerns. "[T]he
Department's decision with respect to espousal is likely to be
influenced, not only by the merits of the case, but by the
Department's concern for offending a foreign state and creating a
potential irritant in its dealings with that state." 8 In one well-
publicized case, the State Department deferred for more than nine
years before rendering a decision on espousal.39 In contrast to the
State Department, the federal courts were free from the pressures
of engaging in "cautious diplomacy" with foreign states. Indeed,
this was one justification for passage of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act in 1976. The House Judiciary Committee's Report
to the original Act states:
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination
of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial
branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of
35. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1991) (codified at 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350 note (1994)).
36. FSIA Hearing at 81 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer).
37. See FSIA Hearing at 83 (prepared statement of Abraham D. Sofaer).
38. FSIA Hearing at 84 (prepared statement of Abraham D. Sofaer).
39. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (petitioner waited more
than nine years for a decision from the Department as to the espousal of his claim
of unlawful detention and torture against Saudi Arabia). See FSIA Hearing at 84
(prepared statement of Abraham D. Sofaer).
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immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often
crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under
procedures that insure due process. The Department of State
would be freed from pressures from foreign governments to
recognize their immunity from suit and from any adverse
consequences resulting from an unwillingness of the
Department to support that immunity.
40
Finally, the antiterrorism amendments may have been
motivated by Congress' fear that effective criminal justice could not
be achieved against terrorists and their government sponsors.
Proponents of the legislation studied the prosecution of the parties
responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Although the
allegations in the criminal complaint identified several high-ranking
officials and the government of Libya as the masterminds of the
bombing, only two Libyans were indicted.4' Furthermore, because
of severe resistance by the Libyan government, extradition of the
bombing suspects to the Netherlands for trial had not been
accomplished by 1996, despite severe economic sanctions by the
United States and United Nations against Libya.2 In light of these
facts, it might have been foreseeable to Congress that the families
of the victims would not be made whole by the application of
international criminal law.
Taken together, these events, concerns and fears motivated
Congress to support the AEDPA amendments to the FSIA.
Although the legislation seemed like a political winner and
garnered the public support of President Clinton 3, the Admin-
istration subsequently intervened in cases filed in federal court and
opposed the enforcement provisions. Absent the support of the
executive branch, enforcement of judgments obtained under the
antiterrorism amendments became nearly impossible.
40. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604; also
reprinted in part in FSIA Hearing at 6 (prepared statement of Rep. Romano L.
Mazzoli).
41. FSIA Hearing at 93 (letter dated June 16, 1994 from Allan Gerson, Esq., to
Sen. Howell Heflin).
42. In fact, extradition was accomplished much later in 1999 after the United
States and the United Kingdom had spent years applying diplomatic and economic
pressure to the Libyan government allegedly responsible for the terrorism. See
CBS Morning News: Long Awaited Verdict Announced in the Trial of Two Libyans
Accused of Blowing Up Pan Am Flight 103 (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 31,
2001). The verdict in the criminal trial was not delivered until January 31, 2001.
Id. Only one of the two defendants was found guilty. Id.
43. See supra note 5; see also Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d
16, 20 n.4 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing President Clinton's public proclamations of
support for the antiterrorism legislation).
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III. Obstacles to Recovery Experienced by Plaintiffs in Cases
Filed under the Antiterrorism Amendments
During the hearings on the bills that later became section 221
of AEDPA, both the State Department and the Justice Department
instructed Congress that the proposed antiterrorism amendments
would not provide an effective remedy for American plaintiffs, for
several reasons. First, foreign states would be reluctant to enter the
courts of the U.S. to defend themselves against charges of violations
of law stemming from conduct within their own borders."
Judgments would have to be obtained in a majority of cases by
default, and foreign states could choose simply to ignore them."
Second, state sponsors of terrorism would likely not have significant
commercial assets in the United States from which judgments could
be paid. 6 Moreover, because the AEDPA amendments departed
from international law norms, it became highly unlikely that
judgments under the amendments would be recognized and
enforced in foreign jurisdictions, or that terrorist states would
maintain significant assets in any jurisdiction which would honor
the U.S. judgments." Finally, the State Department and Justice
Department expressed concern about the vulnerability of U.S.
assets and property located abroad in the event another country
would enact reciprocal legislation.'
Congress did not anticipate the resistance to execution that the
executive branch would offer as a result of these concerns and its
interest in determining U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, Congress did
not anticipate that the federal judiciary would construe the
exceptions to immunity from execution or attachment narrowly in
the face of the antiterrorism amendments. Although passage of the
AEDPA amendments to the FSIA in 1996 inspired several
plaintiffs to file civil suits in the district courts 9 the conflict
44. See FSIA Hearing at 91 (letter from Sheila F. Anthony, Assistant Attorney
General, to Sen. Howell Heflin, providing Justice Department's response to





49. See, e.g., Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla.
1997); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998); Cicippio v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998); Rein v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Smith v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996); Frey v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 110 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2000);
Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545 (D.D.C. July 11,
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between branches effectively precluded them from recovery. Two
early cases brought to judgment, Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba and
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, illustrate some of the more
serious legal obstacles to enforcement of tort judgments against
foreign states.
A. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba
1. Background -A lejandre v. Republic of Cuba" was the first
lawsuit brought under the 1996 AEDPA amendments to the FSIA,
based on the retroactive application of the amendments to an act of
terrorism that occurred on February 24, 1996.1 The Cuban Air
Force shot down two unarmed civilian planes belonging to a Miami-
based humanitarian organization over international waters, killing
all four pilots aboard. 2  The planes were engaged in a routine
mission to search the Florida Straits for Cuban rafters and to notify
the U.S. Coast Guard of their location and condition.53 The attack
was particularly barbarous because the Cuban MiG-29s neither
warned the civilian pilots, nor in any way attempted to intercept or
divert the planes without resort to violence.'
The personal representatives of three of the pilots sued Cuba
and the Cuban Air Force for damages under section 1605(a)(7) of
the FSIA in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida." Neither defendant appeared to defend the
suit.56 Pursuant to the procedure set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e),
the court held an evidentiary hearing to allow the plaintiffs to
establish their claim. 7 The undisputed evidence established that
the acts occurred over international waters more than eighteen
miles from the Cuban coast and that the plaintiffs and three of the
four deceased were American nationals at the time of the killings."
The court found that the unprovoked rocket attacks against the
civilian planes constituted an "extrajudicial killing" within the
2000); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000);
Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
50. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(hereinafter Alejandre I).
51. Alejandre I at 1242, 1243, 1247.
52. Id. at 1242.
53. Id. at 1243.
54. Id. at 1246.
55. Id. at 1242.
56. Alejandre I at 1242. Cuba, however, asserted in a diplomatic note that the
district court had no jurisdiction over it or its political subdivisions. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1248.
20001
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meaning of section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA.5 9 Finally, the court
found that the Cuban Air Force acted on behalf of the Cuban state
because Cuban government officials directed the attacks and
congratulated the pilots after the shootdown. ° Consequently, the
court held the Cuban Air Force liable under section 1605(a)(7) of
the FSIA for compensatory damages in the total amount of $49.9
million and punitive damages in the amount of $137.7 million. 61
The court also held the Republic of Cuba vicariously liable for
compensatory damages under the statutory note to FSIA section
1605.62 On November 5, 1998, the court amended the judgment to
hold Cuba jointly liable for the punitive damages.63
Predictably, Cuba impugned the judgment of the district court.
In a letter dated May 11, 1998, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign
Relations wrote that "[tihe Republic of Cuba is a Sovereign State
and no North American court has jurisdiction to judge it or its
institutions, much less for the events that occurred on February 24,
1996 in Cuban territorial waters .... ,64
2. Enforcement-In 1996, prior to the end of litigation, the
victims' families each received $300,000 paid by the Clinton
Administration out of Cuban bank accounts frozen in 1962.65
Notwithstanding these amounts, following judgment in their favor,
the plaintiffs sought to garnish the debts of nine U.S.
telecommunications carriers and two major U.S. banks owed
allegedly to the Cuban government. 66 The assets had been blocked
from transfer pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Alejandre I at 1253. The punitive damages amount, reflecting the court's
calculation of one percent of the value of the Cuban Air Force's fleet of 102 MiGs,
was awarded to express condemnation of the Cuban government for the acts and
to deter the defendants from committing future terrorist acts. Id.
62. Id. at 1249.
63. See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 183 F. 3d 1277, 1278-79, n. 1 (11th Cir.
1999). The court based its action on the amendment to section 1606 of the FSIA
contained in section 117(b) of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681,
2681-491 (1998).
64. Letter from Ministry to the Honorable Swiss Embassy, U.S.A. Interests
Section, May 11, 1998, reprinted in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d
1317, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (hereinafter Alejandre II).
65. Bill Miller & John Mintz, Once-Supportive U.S. Fights Family Over Iranian
Assets, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1998, at A08.
66. Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, 183 F. 3d 1277,
1279-1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (hereinafter Alejandre IV).
[Vol. 19:1
AWARDING RECOVERY TO TERRORISM VICTIMS
(CACR) and the comprehensive trade embargo established by
President Kennedy in 1962.67
As the result of motions to dissolve the writs of garnishment
filed by seven carrier-garnishees and the Cuban recipient of the
assets, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida was
asked to rule on two threshold issues: whether the frozen assets
were subject to attachment under the antiterrorism amendments,
and whether the assets were subject to garnishment when the agent
involved in the telecommunications service agreements, Empresa
de Telecommunicaciones de Cuba, S.A. ("ETECSA"), was a
private corporation separate from the Cuban government.' The
United States filed three Statements of Interest in support of the
garnishees' positions on these issues.69
With respect to the first question, the court recognized that
unless licensed by the Treasury Department, the CACR prohibit
any U.S. national from attaching or executing the blocked property
of the Cuban government.7' However, the 1998 amendments to the
FSIA that added section 1610(f) specifically authorized the
attachment of such blocked assets.71 Those amendments also
contained a provision that allowed the President to waive the
requirements of subsection 1610(f) in the interest of national
security." President Clinton exercised the waiver on the same day
he signed the Act, October 21, 1998, to block the attachment and
execution of three consular properties owned by Iran in
Washington, D.C. by the plaintiff in Flatow v. Islamic Republic of
Iran73.74 The effect of the President's exercise of authority was
disputed by the parties in Alejandre II.
Prior precedent pertaining to the scope of the President's
authority to waive application of the 1998 attachment provisions in
the interest of national security was not favorable to the Alejandre
plaintiffs. The District Court for the District of Columbia in Flatow
v. Islamic Republic of Iran construed the waiver provision as
authorizing the President to waive the entirety of the new section
1610(f), including the subsection that exposes diplomatic property
67. Alejandre II at 1324-25.
6& Alejandre I at 1326; see also Alejandre IV at 1279-80.
69. Alejandre II at 1327.
70. Id. at 1324.
71. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for 1999 ("Appropriations Act") § 117, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(f)(1)(A), (1)(B), (2)(A), (2)(B) (Supp. 1998))
72. Id. at § 117(d).
73. 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
74. Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,201 (1998).
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to attachment and execution proceedings.75  By contrast, the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Alejandre II
interpreted the waiver provision as allowing the President only to
relieve the State and Treasury Departments from their statutory
duty to assist judgment creditors in locating foreign assets.76
Specifically, it concluded that the President did not have the
authority to waive 28 U.S.C. §1610(f)(1).' The court found the
plain meaning of the waiver provision (section 117(d)) of the
Appropriations Act, as well as the Act's legislative history,
ambiguous.78 However, it justified its ruling by classifying the 1998
Appropriations Act as an extension of the 1996 AEDPA
amendments to the FSIA:
By enacting section 117, Congress expanded the property
subject to attachment/execution, giving the victims a larger pool
of assets from which to satisfy any judgment in their favor. All
of these legislative enactments are guided by a single purpose: to
provide an executable judicial remedy to the nationals of the
United States attacked by a terrorist foreign state.79
The Florida district court also found that its interpretation of
the waiver clause would not harm the President's ability to initiate
or maintain diplomatic relations with terrorist states or affect the
United States' treaty obligations because only commercial, not
diplomatic, property was at risk.' Finally, the court considered the
amount of deference to be accorded the President in matters of
foreign affairs.8 ' It concluded that the President had broad
discretion to exercise the waiver but was not entitled to deference
in the interpretation of the statute.8s  Therefore, the court
concluded that section 1610(f)(1) remained in force. 3 The plaintiffs
could garnish the indebtedness owed to ETECSA and in the
possession of the garnishees without having to obtain a license from
the Office of Foreign Assets Control.
With respect to the second issue relevant to the plaintiffs'
ability to garnish the assets, the court held that ETECSA was an
instrumentality of the Government of Cuba under section 1603(b)
75. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 26-27 (D.D.C. 1999).
76. Alejandre II at 1328-1334.
77. Id. at 1331.
78. Id. at 1329-1330.
79. Id. at 1331.
80. Id. at 1332-33.
81. Alejandre II at 1333.
82. Id. at 1334.
83. Id. at 1331.
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of the FSIA. 4  The court applied the test prescribed by the
Supreme Court in First National City Bank v. Banco Para El
Comercio Exterior de Cuba85 (hereinafter Bancec), under which
government instrumentalities enjoy a presumption of separate
juridical status unless (1) the foreign government so extensively
controls the instrumentality as to give rise to a principal and agent
relationship; or (2) a contrary finding is necessary to prevent fraud
or manifest injustice.' The district court found incidents of
practical control because the Cuban government leased the
telecommunications equipment and facilities to ETECSA and
supplied and paid the majority of ETECSA's labor force.87
However, this did not rise to the level of an agency relationship.'
Rather, the court found that ETECSA had no separate juridical
status because a contrary conclusion would defeat Congress'
"expressed... commitment to subject the property of a govern-
ment instrumentality to attachment or execution to satisfy a
judgment against the terrorist foreign state."89 Because the assets
were payable to an instrumentality of the Cuban government and
were specifically subject to execution under section 1610(f)(1), the
district court denied the carriers' and ETECSA's motions to
dissolve the writs of garnishment. 9
The carriers appealed, however, and the plaintiffs' victory was
largely stripped away by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on
August 11, 1999.9' That court reviewed the district court's
application of the Bancec test de novo and ruled that ETECSA was
a separate juridical entity from the Cuban government.9" First, it
considered an argument that the plaintiffs would be deprived of
relief if the debts to the carriers could not be attached.9 The court
rejected this argument, stating that such a concern was universal,
and that to allow such an easy overcoming of the Bancec
presumption would render it a judicial nullity.9 Next, the court
84. Id. at 1336.
85. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611 (1983)
86. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629-630.
87. Alejandre II at 1339.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1343.
91. Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, 183 F. 3d 1277
(11th Cir. 1999) (hereinafter Alejandre IV).
92. Alejandre IV at 1286, 1288.
93. Id. at 1286.
94. Id. at 1286-87.
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downplayed the importance of the exception to immunity as part of
the government's antiterrorism policy on the grounds that there
was no evidence of ETECSA's involvement in the terrorist act.95
Finally, the court held that section 1610(f)(1)(A) did not subject
property of instrumentalities to execution and attachment, but
rather exposed only property belonging to the foreign government.16
The court noted that Congress had toyed with a bill amending
section 1610(a) explicitly to allow attachment of property of
agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states and therefore could
enact such legislation if it so intended.'
The court then considered whether the plaintiffs proved that
ETECSA was an alter ego of the Cuban government to satisfy the
first Bancec exception.9" The plaintiffs argued that ETECSA
received payments under the OFAC licenses.99 Language in the
statute authorizing the licenses, reproduced in the licenses
themselves, authorized the carriers to make payments "to Cuba" in
exchange for the provision of telecommunications services.1°° The
plaintiffs argued that the language in the statute and licenses
estopped ETECSA and the carriers from denying that ETECSA
was an alter ego of the Cuban government."' The court rejected
this argument."° It found that some of the licenses authorized
transactions specifically with EMTELCUBA (ETECSA's pred-
ecessor) and its successors.' 3 Also, although the authorizing statute
did not define "Cuba," the term "Cuba" under the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations was defined to include "any political
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality" of Cuba, so the statutory
language was not dispositive."
Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had waived their
right to engage in further discovery regarding the actual relation-
ship between ETECSA and the Cuban government. 5 Based on
these reasons, the court vacated the judgment of the district court
95. Id. at 1287.
96. Id.
97. Alejandre IV at 1287-88.
98. Id. at 1288.
99. Id. at 1288-89.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1289.
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and remanded the case for dissolution of the writs of garnishment
that sought to garnish amounts owed to ETECSA.'O
In light of the Eleventh Circuit decision, the plaintiffs had
reached a dead end. Although the court authorized further
discovery into the existence of other funds held by the tele-
communications carriers but owing directly to the Cuban
government"° , the plaintiffs did not locate such assets. Moreover,
the plaintiffs knew that they likely would not receive relief if the
funds discovered owed to an agency or instrumentality of the
Cuban government.
B. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran
1. Background-Like his counterparts in Alejandre, the
plaintiff in Flatow met with considerable resistance in his efforts to
enforce a judgment under section 1610 of the FSIA. In the
underlying case, Alisa Michelle Flatow, a twenty-year-old
American citizen studying during her junior year of college in
Israel, was killed on the Gaza Strip when a suicide bomber drove a
van full of explosives into the passenger bus in which Flatow was
traveling.'9 The Shaqaqi faction of Palestine Islamic Jihad claimed
responsibility for the bombing and was confirmed as the
perpetrator of the act.' °9
Stephen Flatow, the decedent's father and administrator of her
estate, filed suit for wrongful death in federal District Court in
Washington, D.C., pursuant to the retroactive application of 28
U.S.C. §1605(a)(7)." ° The complaint named five defendants: the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and
Security, the Supreme Leader of Iran, the former President of Iran,
and the former head of the Iranian Ministry of Information and
Security."' Iran failed to appear and defend the suit."'
The District Court, after the evidentiary hearing required by 28
U.S.C. § 1608(e), during which the plaintiff met his burdens of
proof and persuasion, entered a default judgment against the
106. Id. at 1290.
107. See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1253 (S.D. Fla.
1999).
108. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998)
(hereinafter Flatow 1).
109. Flatow I at 8-9.
110. Id. at 6, 13.
111. Id. at 9-10.
112 Id. at 6.
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named defendants. 3 Iran's liability was predicated on the fact that
it had been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 continuously
since January 19, 1984."' It sponsored the Shaqaqi faction's
terrorist activities in the Gaza Strip region by supplying the group
with all of its funding. 5 and with training."6 The court found Iran
and the co-defendants jointly and severally liable for loss of
accretions, compensatory damages, solatium and $225,000,000 in
punitive damages.!"7 The latter amount, reflecting three times Iran's
annual expenditure for terrorist activities, was calculated to create a
deterrent to future terrorist activities directed towards
Americans." 8
2. Enforcement-On July 6, 1998, Flatow filed a motion
seeking a court order to attach three parcels of real estate owned by
the Iranian government in Washington, D.C."9, and two Nations-
Bank accounts containing funds generated by the State Depart-
ment's lease of the properties2 ° to satisfy the judgment. 2' The
District Court granted the motion and ordered the writs of
attachment.22 However, the U.S. Marshal's Office notified the U.S.
Departments of State and Treasury, which requested that the
District Court delay attachment until the federal government could
113. Id. at 5, 6.
114. Flatow I at 9.
115. Funding totaled approximately two million dollars annually to Palestine
Islamic Jihad in support of terrorist activities. Flatow I at 9. Iran's sponsorship of
terrorist activities is reflected as a line item in its national budget and totals
approximately seventy-five million dollars annually. Id. at 34.
116. Flatow I at 9.
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id. at 34.
119. Specifically, the properties included the Iranian Embassy and Chancery
and the Iranian Ambassador's residence until April 8, 1980, the residence of the
Iranian military attach6, and the residence of the Iranian Minister of Cultural
Affairs. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 n.3 (D.D.C. 1999)
(hereinafter Flatow IV).
120. The first account, entitled "Blocked Iranian Diplomatic and Consular
Property Renovation Account c/o Blocked Assets Administration, U.S.
Department of Treasury," comprised excess funds and interest generated from the
lease of the real estate to third parties. The second account, entitled "U.S.
Department of State, Office of Foreign Missions, Iranian Renovation Account,"
contained funds generated by the leases but used for maintenance and related
expenses. Flatow IV at 19.
121. Flatow IV at 18.
122. See Ethan J. Early, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran and the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: Is Peace of Mind Enough?, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 203, 228
(1999).
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voice its opposition to attachment. 3 On July 9, 1998, the District
Court temporarily stayed the writs.'
The government filed a statement with the court on July 23,
1998, setting forth several reasons why the attachment should not
proceed.'25 First, the government argued that the Foreign Missions
Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
explicitly prohibited the attachment of the identified properties. 6
Second, the government argued that the properties were not subject
to attachment under the FSIA .1 7 Third, the government argued
that attachment would interfere with the United States' ability to
discharge its international obligations under the Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations.' Finally, the government argued
that the attachment and execution of the properties would
adversely affect the President's ability to promote the foreign policy
interests of the United States. 9 The government requested the
District Court to vacate the July 7, 1998 order issuing the writs of
attachment.' 3°
The district court granted the government's motion and
quashed the writs.'3' The court found it unnecessary to resolve
whether attachment of the properties under section 1610(a)(7) of
the FSIA would impede the President's authority to receive foreign
ministers and consuls or clash with the Foreign Missions Act, the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or the Vienna
Convention.32 Rather, the court decided the case based solely on
its interpretation of the attachment provision of section 1610(a)(7),
under which property in the United States of a foreign state is
subject to execution only if the property is or was "used for
commercial activity in the United States.' ' 33 The court noted that
the "commercial activity" test in the FSIA focuses primarily on the
conduct of the foreign state vis-A-vis the property."M With respect
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 161, 182 (1999) (reproducing in part the
government's statement filed with the court).
126. Id. at 182.
127. Id. at 183.
128. Id. at 184.
129. Id.
130. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. at 182, 185.
131. Flatow IV at 18.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 21-22.
134. Id. at 22.
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to the real estate, the court found that Iran's prior use of the
facilities for diplomatic purposes was sovereign in nature and not
commercial. 3' Also, Iran opposed the lease of its properties; it did
not offer them voluntarily for a commercial purpose.'36 The court
held that
[a]mong its purposes, the FSIA was designed to subject foreign
states to the laws of the United States when they choose to
engage in private commercial activity. To effectuate this
purpose, the statute creates various narrow windows of federal
jurisdiction over foreign states. But if the FSIA could be
applied to foreign state property that is being used by a non-
agent third party, it would expand the class of cases arising
under the Act beyond those limited, enumerated exceptions to
immunity prescribed by Congress, and thus would expose
foreign states to far greater liability than was originally
contemplated under the Act.37
Finally, the court held that the action of the United States in
taking custody of and maintaining the properties was a sovereign
responsibility authorized by section 4305(c) of the Foreign Missions
Act38.' 39 Therefore, the properties were not used for commercial
activity and were immune from attachment under section
1610(a)(7). ' - °
With respect to the bank accounts, the court found that they
too were immune from attachment. 4' One account contained funds
that were specifically licensed to the Office of Foreign Missions to
maintain the properties in good repair, pursuant to the United
States' statutory duty.' That account, which originally contained
Iranian assets, was regulated by the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act and the Iranian Assets Control Regulations
and was subject to section 1610(f)(1)(A) of the FSIA"' However,
the district court found that the President had waived section
135. Id. at 22-23.
136. Flatow IV at 21.
137. Id. at 23 (citations omitted).
138. The Foreign Missions Act provides that "if a foreign mission has ceased
conducting diplomatic, consular and other governmental activities in the United
States, and has not designated a protecting power or other agent... the Secretary,
until the designation of a protecting power or other agent ... may preserve and
protect any property of that foreign mission." 22 U.S.C. § 4305(c) (1994).
139. Flatow IV at 23.
140. Id.
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1610(f)(1)(A) in the interest of national security, and therefore the
funds were not subject to attachment.'44
The assets in the other account, reflecting the profits and
interest generated by the leases of the property by the United
States, did not constitute Iranian property, and the court therefore
concluded that the FSIA did not apply to the funds.145 Because
Stephen Flatow did not argue any express waiver of sovereign
immunity by the United States, the court held that he was not
entitled to attach that account. 6
The court expressed its regret at Stephen Flatow's "Pyrrhic
victory," but shifted the burden to Congress to pass legislation
authorizing attachments of the type sought.147  It noted that
Congress rejected a bill in 1999 that would have amended section
1610(f) of the FSIA to permit the attachment of foreign mission
property used for nondiplomatic purposes and proceeds from the
rental of such property.'48
Stephen Flatow next sought to attach an arbitration award
entered by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal against FMC
Corporation. 149 The February 12, 1987 award arose out of a
contract dispute involving the sale of military equipment to Iran.5
Flatow argued that the award was property of Iran "used for
commercial activity in the United States" and qualified for
attachment under section 1610(a)(7) of the FSIA."' However, the
court found that because the three-year statute of limitations for
confirming and enforcing the award had expired, the award was
null and void.5 Therefore, the court concluded that Iran had no
enforceable property rights in the award, and it could not be
property used for commercial activity in the United States."3 The
court also noted that Flatow's claim to the property under section
1610(f)(1)(A) of the FSIA also failed because the President had
waived the requirements of the section in the interest of national
security.1
4
144. Flatow IV at 24, 27.
145. Id. at 24.
146. Id. at 24-25.
147. Id. at 27-28.
148. Id. at 28.






154. Flatow V at 29-30.
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These defeats occurred in the context of a series of losses for
Stephen Flatow. On September 7, 1999, the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland quashed Flatow's November 9,
1998 writs of execution against two parcels of real estate owned by
the Alavi Foundation."' Flatow argued, based on independent
investigation and information supplied by representatives of the
Departments of State, Treasury and Justice, that the Foundation
was an agency or instrumentality of the government of Iran.'56
Under Maryland law, for Flatow to levy on the Foundation's
property, he had to prove that the Foundation was an agent, alter
ego, instrumentality, or garnishee of Iran, or that Iran conveyed
property to the Foundation to defraud creditors.'57 The court
concluded that Flatow did not show the necessary agency
relationship and did not seek a writ of garnishment or argue the
fraud theory. "8  First, section 1603(b)(3) narrowly defined an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as an entity not a citizen
of any state of the United States.9 The Alavi Foundation was a
nonprofit corporation organized under New York law. Therefore,
it was a citizen of New York and was entitled to a strong
presumption of independence from the government of Iran."6 To
overcome the presumption and to establish an agency relationship,
Flatow had to prove that the Iranian government exercised day-to-
day control over the Foundation's activities. 6' Despite his attempts,
Flatow did not convince the court that day-to-day control existed. 62
Therefore, the court ordered the release of the properties from levy
and enjoined Flatow from issuing additional writs against the Alavi
Foundation's property.
Finally, on November 15, 1999, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia issued an order granting the
United States' motion to quash Flatow's November 18, 1998 writ of
attachment against "all credits held by the United States to the
benefit of the Islamic Republic of Iran."' '6 Flatow attempted to
155. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (D. Md. 1999)
(hereinafter Flatow 11).
156. Id. at 540-42.
157. Id. at 538.
15& Id. at 543.
159. Id. at 538.
160. Flatow H at 538.
161. Id. at 538-539.
162. Id. at 540.
163. Id. at 543.
164. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 19 (D.D.C. 1999)
(hereinafter Flatow III).
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attach $5,042,481.65 and interest held in the U.S. Treasury
Judgment Fund.' The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal had awarded
judgment in this amount to Iran on June 5, 1998, but the U.S. had
not paid the judgment.' 66 Flatow argued that the funds were the
property of Iran, as defined by the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, and therefore were subject to attachment under
sections 1610(f)(1)(A) and (a)(7) of the FSIA.67 The United States
argued that the Treasury funds were U.S. property and that the
U.S. was immune from suit for attachment under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.' 6' The court held that under controlling
federal law, funds remaining in the U.S. Treasury, though
designated to satisfy a judgment against the United States, remain
the property of the United States until actually disbursed by the
government.69 Therefore, Flatow's writ of attachment was barred
unless he could show that the U.S. expressly and unequivocally
waived its sovereign immunity.' The court also noted that
judgment creditors could not obtain money from the Treasury
without a statute specifically authorizing payment. 7' It found the
language in the Iranian Assets Control Regulations insufficient to
waive the United States' sovereign immunity.'72 Similarly, the court
engaged in an analysis of the semantics of section 1610(f)(1)(A) of
the FSIA and found that its opening phrase, "notwithstanding any
other provision of law," was insufficiently explicit to authorize
waiver of the sovereign immunity of the U.S. and attachment and
execution of the Treasury funds.'73 The court noted that Congress
was familiar with the requirements of an unequivocal expression of
waivers of sovereign immunity and could have included such a
waiver if that was its intent.
74
Flatow also attempted an argument based on the section
1610(a)(7) "commercial activity" exception because the Tribunal
judgment sprung from a contract dispute involving sales of aircraft
equipment between Iran and Avco Corporation, a U.S.




169. Flatow III at 20, 21.
170. Id. at 20.
171. Id. at 22, citing Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Darla Envtl. Specialists, 53 F.
3d 181, 182 (7th Cir. 1995).
172 Id. at 23.
173. Id. at 24.
174. Flatow III at 24.
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enterprise. '75 The court rejected the argument because it found that
the funds were not Iranian property.7 6 Flatow also argued the
Algiers Accords contained an express waiver of U.S. and Iranian
sovereign immunity with respect to the enforcement of Tribunal
awards.'77 Flatow asserted that by virtue of his judgment, he stood
in the shoes of Iran and could enforce the Tribunal award against
the U.S."8 The district court disagreed and found that the Accords
did not authorize third party creditors to enforce judgments on
behalf of Iran.179 Flatow again was precluded from relief.
IV. Analysis: Why Has the Executive Branch Opposed
Enforcement of the Antiterrorism Amendments?
A. United States' Opposition to Enforcement is Based on
Competing Foreign Policy Goals
Opposition to enforcement by the Executive branch has been
based largely on concerns that enforcement of multimillion-dollar
judgments against foreign sovereigns and their agents would
undermine the Executive's authority in the area of foreign policy.
These concerns seem rational. For example, the antiterrorism
amendments to the FSIA unilaterally extend federal jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns for purposes of tort without deference to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity recognized under international
law. The amendments function essentially as a federal long-arm
statute that specifies that certain foreign states submit to the
jurisdiction of the U.S. district courts when the sole relevant contact
with the forum involves the killing of a U.S. national, even if the act
of killing occurs abroad, the U.S. victim is not the intended target of
the attack, and there is no other relationship between the foreign
state and the forum. The foreign state has not knowingly and
voluntarily waived its sovereign immunity, nor has it consented to
jurisdiction under these circumstances. As such, it is to be expected
that the foreign state will not honor or recognize the judgment.
Comity between nations does not require recognition of a judgment
that is considered void as against the terrorist state's public policy,
sovereign immunity. Moreover, there are many unresolved
questions regarding due process and whether the U.S. court can
175. Id. at 24-25.
176. Id. at 25.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Flatow III at 25.
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exercise personal jurisdiction under such circumstances absent the
foreign state's consent.
In light of these issues, the seizure of foreign assets located in
the United States pursuant to the FSIA might add to tensions that
the Executive branch would like to resolve. For example, the
United States would like to improve diplomatic relations with Iran
as part of its efforts to stabilize the Middle East."8 Some U.S. allies
in Europe have called for the resumption of trade and diplomatic
relations with Libya and the elimination of the longstanding
sanctions regime against that country."' The U.S. may one day
choose to recognize and promote the democratization of Cuba and
expand trade with that nation. Frozen assets provide a powerful
bargaining chip in meeting each of these goals."8 For example, the
U.S. can release such assets gradually to reward countries for
behavior the U.S. favors.183 The assets also can be used to resolve
outstanding judgments via "global settlements," in exchange for the
U.S. conferring diplomatic recognition and resuming economic
trade." Inasmuch as section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA has allowed
the creation of large judgments against state sponsors of terrorism,
the United States has not opposed litigation brought by private
plaintiffs.
However, allowing private plaintiffs to enforce the judgments
by tapping into the frozen assets located in the United States
threatens the government's interests and may weaken the
government's negotiating position. For example, U.S. opposition to
Stephen Flatow's attempts to execute on his judgment is based
in part on concern that they will complicate efforts by the two
countries to resolve conflicting multibillion-dollar claims in two
separate proceedings in international courts at the Hague. Iran
has alleged that there are $12 billion in the United States looted
from the country by the shah, a claim U.S. officials have
180. See, e.g., Upfront Tonight: U.S. Government Reaching Out for Better
Relationship with Iran After it Voted in a New Reform Government During its Past
Elections (CNBC broadcast, Mar. 19, 2000) (following election of reform majority
to Iranian government, Clinton Administration announced that some Iranian
assets frozen since the 1979 hostage crisis would be returned and that ban on some
Iranian products, such as carpets, dried fruits, nuts and caviar, would be lifted).
181. See James Blitz, Italy Pursues Goal of Increased Libya Trade, FINANCIAL
TIMES (London), Dec. 3, 1999, at 13.
182. See U.S. Quashes Attachment by Terrorism Victim Against Iranian
Property, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Jan. 2000.
183. See Bill Miller and John Mintz, Once-Supportive U.S. Fights Family Over
Iranian Assets, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1998, at A08.
184. Id.
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dismissed. Any eventual rapprochement between the two
nations would involve a settlement of these massive financial
disputes .... Iran's regime has been preoccupied by these
claims for years. Former U.S. officials point out that a lengthy
stalemate in a previous controversy - Tehran's detention of U.S.
diplomats - was broken in 1981 when Washington agreed to
release to Iran $10 billion in previously frozen bank accounts.
The Flatows could stand a better chance of collecting by waiting
for such a "global" settlement between the two governments
185
The government also has expressed concerns about the
collateral effects of enforcement. If judgment creditors suddenly
were to receive a favorable decision allowing execution on frozen
assets, other potential plaintiffs might file suits to claim their piece
of the pie."8 As the assets decreased, so would the United States'
leverage to achieve other foreign policy goals with respect to the
foreign state.
B. FSIA Plaintiffs Must Overcome Other Significant Legal and
Practical Hurdles
To some extent, the Clinton Administration's predictions
about the effectiveness of the FSIA have been correct. First,
foreign states have ignored the proceedings filed under section
1605(a)(7) of the Act. Second, none of the seven nations
designated as state sponsors of terrorism by the State Department
maintains constructive diplomatic and economic relations with the
United States. Logically, it follows that these nations do not have
much property in the U.S. which might be "used for a commercial
purpose" within the meaning of section 1610(a)(7) of the FSIA.
The court decisions bolstered the Administration's credibility. For
instance, Flatow H made it clear that seized diplomatic and consular
property currently being used for commercial purposes is off-limits
to judgment creditors. So are temporary funds in the U.S. Treasury
slated to pay the debts and judgments of the United States owing to
terrorist nations.187 Finally, the courts have been reluctant to
scrutinize the form and function of third party corporations that
185. Id.
186. See testimony of Deputy Treasury Secretary of State Stuart E. Eizenstat,
noted in Laurence Arnold, Families Blast U.S. Roadblocks to Compensation for
Terrorism, RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Oct. 28, 1999, at A8.
187. See Flatow III, supra note 164.
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front for foreign governments to make assets available for
execution."s
The remaining battles recently litigated in the federal courts
have dealt with creditors' ability to garnish funds flowing from
businesses in the United States to foreign entities. Even if the
target funds satisfy the "commercial purpose" exception to
immunity from attachment, plaintiffs still must show that the recipi-
ents are not juridically separate from the terrorist government.
This boils down to plaintiffs proving factually that the entity to
which the funds flowed was the alter ego of the state. The burden is
compounded by the difficulty of engaging in international discovery
with noncooperative garnishees.
Until very recently, it seemed certain that FSIA plaintiffs
would not recover any money on their judgments unless the United
States assisted them or Congress amended the antiterrorism regime
again. In 1999, Congress took up the challenge and attempted to
pass additional legislation to further amend the FSIA. Senate Bill
1796, entitled "Bill to Modify the Enforcement of Certain Anti-
Terrorism Judgments, and For Other Purposes," would have
permitted victims of terrorism to attach foreign assets located in the
United States, including foreign mission property no longer used
for diplomatic purposes. The measure did not garner enough
support to pass.'89 In 2000, however, Congress was successful in
obtaining support for new legislation that forces the Executive
branch to subordinate its foreign policy authority to Congress.
V. Epilogue: The 2000 Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and
Its Repercussions
On October 28, 2000, following intensive lobbying by victims
of terrorism, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.19'
Contained within that Act is the Justice for Victims of Terrorism
Act (JVTA)91 , which modifies and incorporates several provisions
of House Bill 3485 and Senate Bill 1796, both introduced in late
1999. Among its relevant provisions, the antiterrorism legislation
directs the Secretary of the United States Treasury to pay upon
request to a qualifying claimant 100 or 110 percent of compensatory
18& See Flatow II, supra note 155.
189. See Flatow IV, supra note 119, at 28.
190. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
191. Sections 2002-2004 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000.
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damages awarded by a court judgment on claims filed under 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), plus post-judgment interest and any amounts
awarded by judicial order as sanctions against Cuba."9  To be
entitled to 100 percent, the claimant must "relinquish all rights to
execute against or attach property that is at issue in claims against
the United States before an international tribunal, that is the
subject of awards rendered by such tribunal, or that is subject to [28
U.S.C. §1610(f)(1)(A)]."' 93 To receive the ten percent premium, the
claimant also must relinquish all rights and claims to punitive
damages awarded in the judgment.9
The Act's funding provisions are highly controversial. In the
case of judgments against Cuba, the Act gives the President the
authority to vest and liquidate property of Cuba and judicially
sanctioned entities in the United States that has been blocked
pursuant to the section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act,
sections 202 and 203 of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, or derivative proclamations, orders, or regulations.'95
The Act also specifies that sanctions payments shall be made from
funds or accounts subject to sanctions, or from blocked assets of the
Cuban government.' 96 In the case of judgments against Iran, the
amounts are to be paid from rental proceeds from Iranian
diplomatic and consular property located in the U.S. and other
frozen assets, subject to a maximum limit for all claims against Iran
of approximately $400 million.97 If the United States pays money
to a victim in connection with a Foreign Military Sales Program
account, it becomes subrogated to the extent of the payments to the
rights of the judgment creditor against the debtor state. The Act
directs the President to pursue the United States' rights "as claims
or offsets of the United States in appropriate ways, including any
negotiation process which precedes the normalization of relations
between the foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism
and the United States .. ,,19' In the case of Iran, the Act is specific:
neither may the United States pay or release blocked assets to Iran,
nor may the President normalize relations with Iran, until the
subrogated claims have been satisfied.' 99
192. Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act § 2002(a).
193. Id. § 2002(a)(2)(D).
194. Id. § 2002(a)(2)(C).
195. Id. § 2002(b)(1).
196. Id.
197. Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act § 2002(b)(2).
198. Id. § 2002(c).
199. Id. § 2002(d).
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Although the new law seems to bring closure to the victims'
struggle to achieve compensation by guaranteeing a speedy
recovery2", it also seems certain to exacerbate the problems created
by the early amendments to the FSIA. Moreover, the law may
increase the political and economic tensions between the United
States and its foreign adversaries that fuel terrorism in the first
place. For example, the Iranian government has taken admittedly
retaliatory steps to encourage litigation by Iranian citizens against
the U.S. government by exempting plaintiffs' attorneys' fees from
income taxes.0' Iran has reaffirmed its belief that the $1.2 billion of
judgments obtained against it by U.S. plaintiffs violate due process
and are illegal according to international laws and conventions. 2 2 It
has warned that the new law is counterproductive to the Clinton
Administration's efforts to improve U.S. - Iranian relations, will
"raise the wall of distrust between the two countries to a newer
level," and will in the long run "end up hurting U.S. national
interests and its people. 203 The United States should be concerned.
It maintains significant assets abroad, which might be subject to
attachment and seizure in execution of retaliatory judgments
obtained under foreign laws. In addition, the JVTA severely
constrains the President's foreign policy discretion by precluding
normalization of relations with terrorist states until the money
judgments are recovered. This in turn may "make rogue govern-
ments defensive [and] discourag[e] dialogue, engagement, political
reform, and integration by these states into international legal and
financial regimes.""' ° Whereas frozen assets previously might have
been available for the U.S. to use to encourage or to reward
political reform abroad, release of the assets will now be
conditioned upon reimbursement of the Treasury for the judgments
paid. And inasmuch as the new law complicates and prolongs the
200. Indeed, by the time this Comment is published, more than 16 families will
have received financial compensation from the U.S. government totaling in excess
of $424.5 million, plus significant interest payments. See Bill Miller, Terrorism
Victims Set Precedent; U.S. to Pay Damages, Collect from Iran, WASH. POST, Oct.
22, 2000, at A01.
201. See Iran: Majlis Deputy Condemns USA for Anti-Iranian Bill, "Iran News"
web site, Tehran, in English, Nov. 2, 2000; reported by BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, available in LEXIS, News Group File.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 102, available in LEXIS, Magazine Stories, Combined
file.
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existing sanctions regime, it will likely encourage additional anti-
U.S. sentiment abroad and fuel terrorism.
Even more troublesome, however, is the extent to which the
Congress has made the federal courts its agents in abrogating
foreign sovereign immunity.
The very basis of jurisdiction over foreign states in these cases -
designation by the State Department of a government as a
supporter of terrorism - is itself a political decision that the
court then endorses. Often foreign states do not even appear to
defend themselves. In such an environment, the fairness of the
proceedings becomes questionable. Judges may be tempted to
set policy from the bench, and the perception of impartiality will
suffer.205
In addition, under the 2000 JVTA, the judiciary must
determine the amounts to be awarded as sanctions against Cuba,
which involves the concept of "punishment" of another sovereign
better reserved to the Executive branch. Diplomatic property
located in the United States is no longer sacred and worthy of
protection, and it may be that a district court in a future suit will be
required to attach rental proceeds from foreign government
property located on U.S. soil. And the judicial system may soon be
burdened with new suits by plaintiffs eager to persuade the courts
ex parte that they too were victims of international terrorism.
VI. Conclusion
The reader should query whether, in light of the recent JVTA,
the antiterrorism amendments to the FSIA have served their
designated purposes. Congress enacted the antiterrorism amend-
ments with two major goals in mind: to compel foreign state
sponsors of terrorism to provide compensation to American victims
of international terrorist attacks, and to deter such states from
engaging in terrorism and sponsorship by making the financial costs
prohibitively high. Arguably, the 1996 and 1998 amendments did
neither, and the most recent amendments do little more than
respond to Congress' political need to placate the plaintiffs by
paying them off.
The early amendments sought to hold foreign governments
directly accountable to American plaintiffs by extending the
jurisdiction of the U.S. district courts over agents of terrorism. The
system didn't work because the courts were reluctant to authorize
205. Id.
[Vol. 19:1
AWARDING RECOVERY TO TERRORISM VICTIMS
the seizure of foreign assets and to allow private citizens to deal the
final blow to sovereign immunity absent the concurrence of the
Executive and Legislative branches. In an effort to correct the
problem, Congress interposed the JVTA and inadvertently made
matters much worse. The JVTA relieves the foreign government
from direct accountability to the plaintiffs. Under the JVTA, the
U.S. government offers cash to the victims to separate them and the
legal mechanism Congress designed from the diplomatic process of
resolving international disputes. It also undermines the
effectiveness of the judgments by eliminating the punitive damages
awards. In contrast to the legal mechanism, the diplomatic process
compels respect for the sovereignty of the adversary state and
attempts to leverage frozen assets of that state to compel
reimbursement. In other instances, particularly with respect to the
Cuban judgments, the Executive branch may be required to act as
the agent of the plaintiffs and to liquidate frozen assets to
reimburse the government.' Notwithstanding the directives in the
JVTA, many critics of the law are skeptical that the government
will actually recover.
In either case, the terrorists will not be deterred. It is difficult
to envision the antiterrorism regime working any hardship on
terrorists if assets belonging to their home states but frozen and
unavailable for the past 20 or 30 years are reduced to offset civil
judgments. Perhaps the real solution to the problem lies in
strengthening domestic and international criminal laws. After all,
how can the survivors of terrorist attacks who lost years of their
own freedom as hostages or close family members during bombings
sense any real justice when the perpetrators of the crimes maintain
their freedom? In other words, is the government's proffered
financial compensation merely a placebo to resolve temporarily the
ache of manifest injustice?
Sean P. Vitrano
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